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mission. Part I gives a background on institutional considerations and makes recommendations
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INTRODUCTION
A series of spectacular state aid decisions in 1994 has given
rise to a vivid debate about the efficiency and the merits
of the Commission's state aid control: the recent subsidies
to ailing steel companies,1 airlines,2 and the French group,
* Director General, Directorate General for Competition, Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities. Member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal. All views expressed in this Article are strictly personal.
1. See Exemption from Community Policy on Aid to the Steel Industry, 27 E.C
BULL., no. 4, at 25-26 (1994); Decision to Initiate Proceedings Under Article 6(4) of the
Steel Code, 27 E.C. BULL., no. 7/8, at 31-32 (1994); State aid, Decisions to Raise No
Objection, 27 E.C. BULL., no. 9, at 21-22 (1994); Positive Final Decisions, 27 E.C BULL.,
no. 9, at 26 (1994); Steel, 27 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 22 (1994); Exemption from Commu-
nity Policy on Aid to the Steel Industry, 27 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 24 (1994); Exemption
from Community Policy on Aid to the Steel Industry, 27 E.C. BULL., no. 11, at 22
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Bull,' have triggered the discussions that are particularly critical
in certain Member States and in the Anglo-U.S. print media.
They have even reached learned law reviews and are actively pur-
sued before the Courts in Luxembourg. Because most of these
decisions are subjudice, it is not appropriate to discuss individual
cases. This Article will examine some structural elements of
state aid control and try to raise the level of understanding for
what is undoubtedly one of the most difficult and delicate tasks
of the Commission.
This Article is not meant to be apologetic. The increasing
public debate about state aids and control through the Commis-
sion is healthy and to be welcomed. The European Council has
repeatedly stated that strict state aid control is an essential ele-
ment of the efficient functioning of the Internal Market. Con-
troversial public debates, in both institutionalized democratic
fora and the non-institutionalized media, will contribute to state
aid policy as much as the rapidly growing number of Court deci-
sions, which are a visible expression of the exponentially increas-
ing applications to the European Courts and the corresponding
judicialization of state aid control.
I. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. State Aid Control Is Unique
The starting point is well known but worth recalling briefly.
State aid control is traditionally unknown to states, whether they
are organized as central states, federations or confederations.
State aid control is a unique' feature of the European Union
("EU" or "Union"). It is the experience of the Union that has
inspired the successive GATT subsidy codes and its recent ex-
(1994); Decisions to Initiate Proceedings Under Article 6(4) of the Steel Aid Code, 27
E.C. BuLL., no. 11, at 22-25 (1994).
2. Commission Decision No. 91/555/EEC, O.J. L 300/48 (1991) (Sabena); Com-
mission Decision No. 94/118/EC, O.J. L 54/30 (1994) (Aer Lingus); Authorization for
State Aid, O.J. C 236/2 (1992) (Iberia) and Decision of 1 March 1995, not yet pub-
lished; Commission Decision No. 94/653/EC, O.J. L 254/73 (1994) (Air France); Com-
mission Decision No. 94/662/EC, O.J. L 258/26 (1994) (Air France); Commission De-
cision No. 94/696/EC, O.J. L 273/22 (1994) (Olympic); Commission Decision No. 94/
698/EC, O.J. L 279/29 (1994) (TAP).
3. 27 E.C. Bull., no. 10, at 24 (1994).
4. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aids Under European Community Competition
Law, 18 FoRDHAM ITr'L L.J. 411; 1994 ForeHAM Coiu. L. INST. - (Barry E. Hawk ed.
1995) (forthcoming).
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ports of state aid control mechanisms to the European Eco-
nomic Area and to neighboring countries, in particular Central
and Eastern Europe.
State aid control in the EU had to be established progres-
sively from scratch. Neither the authors of the Treaties nor the
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
("ECSC") and the Commission of the European Economic Com-
munity ("EEC") could have recourse to earlier international or
national practice. Even today, the understanding of state aid
control is underdeveloped; compare the wealth of writing on an-
titrust questions to the dearth of publications on state aid issues.
One of the most obvious questions, which should intrigue
economists and lawyers alike, goes to the very essence of state aid
control. Why can federations function without any central moni-
toring mechanism? Is it the democratic process that makes state
aid control superfluous? Are state subsidies de facto disciplined
by the taxing and spending powers of the federation? Are there
any other mechanisms that fulfill the role that state aid control
by the Commission assumes in the EU?
B. State Aid Control Is "Constitutional"
State aid control in the EU is of constitutional nature, both
with respect to substance and procedure. With the exception of
common policies, agriculture, fisheries and transport, coal and
steel, and shipbuilding, the Council has not enacted secondary
legislation for state aid control. The compatibility of state subsi-
dies is examined on the basis of the substantive rules of Article
92 and according to the procedural provisions of Article 93 of
the EC Treaty.5 Article 94, which allows the Council to "make
any appropriate regulations for the application of Articles 92
and 93," has remained virgin territory. In this sense, it is quite
different from Article 87, which has been used abundantly for
the implementation of the EC Treaty's antitrust rules.
5. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 92-93, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. 573, 631 [hereinafter EC Treaty] incorporating changes made by Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Oj. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinaf-
ter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987]
2 C.M.L.R. 741, in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'I Pub.
Off. 1987).
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At first sight, the lack of secondary legislation enacted
under Article 94 is astonishing. Would it not have been useful to
refine the procedural provisions of Article 93, something that is
expressly foreseen in Article 94? Why not introduce a de
minimis rule in order to rationalize the state aid control mecha-
nism of the EC Treaty?
On reflection and in the light of experience, the absence of
Council regulations and of preceding Commission proposals is
perfectly understandable. During the 1960's, the Council's in-
ability to reach agreement blocked all attempts to legislate under
Article 94. The Commission has since abstained from making
proposals. The Italian Government undertook the last initiative
to revive Article 94 in the first semester of 1991, when it chaired
the Council. The initiative was rejected by at least half of the
Member States. Recent experiences in the steel sector demon-
strate that the Council is unable to deal with state aid issues in a
rational manner. Expressions such as "horse trading" or "hos-
tage taking" come to mind when one wants to qualify the Coun-
cil's behavior in state aid cases. The Commission is well advised
to continue its deliberate policy to avoid recourse to Article 94 as
long as possible.
What are the explanations for the few exceptional situations
in which the Council has enacted special rules for state aids?
The case of common policies in agriculture, fisheries and trans-
port is obvious, because state aids are market-correcting instru-
ments par excellence. It is normal to fund and regulate them
specifically in view of the objectives of these policies. State aid to
shipbuilding are expressly mentioned in Article 92 (3) (c). The
authors of the EEC Treaty acknowledged the particular charac-
ter of an industry, which is exposed to world wide competition
but cannot be protected by traditional trade law instruments.6
Subsidies for coal and steel should normally not be subject to
specific rules. According to Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty,
they are totally prohibited.7
6. Council Directive No. 69/262, O.J. L 206/25 (1969) and subsequent amend-
ments.
7. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 4(c), Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in TRArIs ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). "[S]ubsidies or aids granted by
States, or special charges imposed by States, in any form whatsoever" are incompatible
with the common market. Id.
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This prohibition, however, proved to be excessive and unen-
forceable in the real world. After years of total disregard, it was
replaced by successive state aid codes enacted under Article 95
of the ECSC Treaty which follows closely the provisions of Arti-
cles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. While more generous for coal,8
which is hardly traded between Member States, the state aid re-
gime for steel9 is stricter than the Commission's practice under
Article 92 for regional and restructuring aid in general.10 In
practice, this has not led to outright prohibitions but to deroga-
tions granted according to Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty and
therefore legally legitimate, but highly unsatisfactory from other
perspectives.
C. State Aid Control Is a Natural Commission Monopoly
According to Article 93, state aid control is entrusted to the
Commission and to the Commission alone. The only exception
is to be found in Article 93(2), which allows the Council, acting
unanimously, to declare a state aid to be compatible "if such a
decision is justified by exceptional circumstances." This safe-
guard clause has been very rarely used, and since the early
1960's, never outside the agricultural sector.
As a direct result of the EC Treaty, the Commission's re-
sponsibility for state aid control is fundamentally different from
its position in antitrust matters. Articles 85 and 86 do not estab-
lish a Commission monopoly to implement these prohibitions,
but leave the definition of its functions to Council regulations to
be enacted under Article 87. The Council has done so in Regu-
lation No. 17/6211 (and its followers for different modes of trans-
port) .12 Council Regulation No. 4064/8913 has established the
Commission's responsibilities in the field of merger control.
Antitrust specialists know about the vivid debate whether
the Commission's monopoly to implement Article 85(3) should
be maintained or not. It is remarkable that such a debate is con-
8. See Commission Decision No. 3632/93/ECSC, O.J. L 329/12 (1993).
9. Commission Decision No. 3855/91/ECSC, OJ. L 362/57 (1991).
10. Community Guidelines No. 94/C 368/05, O.J. C 368/12 (1994).
11. [1962] OJ. Spec. Ed. 87.
12. Council Regulation No. 1017/68, OJ. Spec. Ed. 302 (1968) (inland transport);
Council Regulation No. 4056/86, O.J. L 378/4 (1986) (maritime transport); Council
Regulation No. 3975/87, OJ. L 374/1 (1987) (air transport).
13. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, OJ. L 257/14 (1990).
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spicuously absent in the state aid sector. Nobody has ever con-
tested that the EU needs an arbiter who ensures at the Union
level that state aid rules are respected. Nobody has ever sug-
gested that this function could be shared with or delegated to
Member States, as is suggested for individual decisions under Ar-
ticle 85 (3).
D. Should State Aid Control Be Entrusted to an Independent
European Competition Office?
The recent controversies about spectacular state aid deci-
sions have produced one new idea. State aid control should be
entrusted to an independent European Competition Office.
The source of inspiration is obvious. It is the traditional German
request to establish an independent European Cartel Office to
decide on antitrust matters. The model for such a European
Cartel Office is the highly successful and respected
Bundeskartellamt in Berlin.
This Article will not discuss the pros and cons of an in-
dependent EC antitrust agency. Suffice it to say that there are
good reasons to promote actively the idea, even if its realization
appears to be premature for the next couple of years. These
reasons have been set forth elsewhere. 14
The proposal to entrust state aid control to an independent
European Competition Office, though at first sight similar, is of
a totally different nature. It is also totally unrealistic, and thus
not worth serious consideration.
What are the reasons for this negative assessment? Antitrust
rules are addressed to enterprises. Since the Second World War
they have spread to many parts of the world. Since the end of
the Cold War, they have expanded with extraordinary speed in
Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Their im-
plementation is, almost without exception, entrusted to adminis-
trative agencies more or less independent of governments or
courts.15 The EU is one of the few exceptions, which might dis-
appear over time.
14. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on a European Cartel Office, 32 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. - (forthcoming 1995).
15. For a survey of the way in which national competition laws are implemented in
the EU's Member States, see P. BARTODZIEJ, REFORM DER EG-WETTWEBERBSAUFSICHT UND
GEMEINSCHAFMSRECHT 123-26 (1994).
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As we have seen in the beginning, the situation of state aid
control is totally different. State aid rules are not addressed to
enterprises, but to states. They limit the freedom of govern-
ments, even of parliaments, to grant financial advantages to cer-
tain sectors of their economy, irrespective of the technique that
may be used, including tax and social security rebates. State aid
control is therefore a serious and highly sensitive interference
with national sovereignty. It is, as we have explained, unique to
the EU.
It is not realistic to assume that this control will be entrusted
to a non-political expert panel, such as a Cartel or Competition
Office. Because of its very nature, it will remain the responsibil-
ity of an essentially political body, such as the Commission.
E. Shrinking Margins of Political Discretion
This statement implies that state aid control requires a
wider margin of political discretion than decisions in antitrust
matters. It should be noted, however, that this margin is not
without limits, as it is exercised under the vigilant eyes of the
judges in Luxembourg. Even more important is the fact that the
originally wide margin of discretion is constantly shrinking. Two
factors work to limit discretion. The first factor is the Commis-
sion's own decision making, whether in the form of general
statements, such as guidelines, frameworks, notices, etc., or of
individual decisions. The second is the jurisprudence of the Eu-
ropean Courts. Since 1993, the Court of First Instance has juris-
diction over many state aid cases, 16 and will examine even more
thoroughly than the Court of Justice the underlying facts and
their economic appreciation by the Commission. It has already
been mentioned that applications against state aid decisions are
rapidly increasing in number and in sophistication. Judicial re-
view is one of the fastest-growing sectors, if not the fastest-grow-
ing, of the Courts' activities in Luxembourg.
F. Increasing Transparency
As in the case of the European Cartel Office, the plea for an
16. For the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, see Council Decision No.
88/591/ECSC, EEC, EURATOM, O.J. L 319/1 (1988), corigendum O.J. L 241/4 (1989),
amended &y Council Decision No. 93/350/EURATOM, ECSC, EEC, O.J. L 144/21
(1993), amended by Council Decision No. 94/149/ECSC, O.J. L 66/29 (1994).
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independent State Aid Control Agency is motivated at least in
part by a perceived lack of transparency. The situation in the
Union, however, is more transparent than in any other part of
the world, as it is the only place in which all state aid projects are
subject to a procedure of prior and systematic scrutiny. In addi-
tion, transparency within the EU will increase further over the
coming years. The reasons are both political and legal. There is
growing demand by Member States for information and expla-
nation of the Commission's decision making practice with re-
spect to state aids granted by other Member States; this demand
is reinforced by the overall debate on transparency following the
Maastricht Treaty negotiations. Another political factor is the
Commission's determination to pursue its policy of issuing more
guidelines, frameworks, notices, etc. These documents explain
in advance how the Commission will react to certain categories
of state aid projects such as regional aid, aid in favor of research
and development, the protection of the environment, small and
medium sized enterprises, employment, etc.
Legal requirements for increased transparency will be gen-
erated by the Courts in Luxembourg, in particular by the Court
of First Instance. Observers of the Courts will confirm that the
recent jurisprudence shows a tendency to align the procedural
rights of private parties in the state aid sector on those which
they enjoy in antitrust matters. This tendency is the procedural
expression of a fundamental shift that has occurred almost im-
perceptibly over the last years. Aid granted by a Member State is
no longer controlled exclusively or principally in the interest of
other Member States, but also, and perhaps even more so, in the
interest of the competitors of the intended beneficiaries of the
aid. The original macroeconomic approach of the authors of
the EEC Treaty is being supplanted progressively by a
microeconomic perspective, similar to that which has always
dominated substantive and procedural antitrust law.
G. The EU's Interest in Exporting State Aid Control
Because of the high degree of transparency of state aid con-
trol in the EU, which will continue to increase in the future, the
EU has every interest in advancing the scrutiny of subsidies at
the international level. This is true of both substance and proce-
dure, i.e. monitoring. If such rules do not exist or if they are not
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effectively implemented, non member countries will benefit gra-
tuitously from the EU's internal control mechanism. Such a situ-
ation is clearly not desirable. It might in the end even jeopard-
ize the correct functioning of the EU's own state aid control.
Contrary to commonly held views about the risks of subjecting
oneself to international rules, the EU has nothing to lose and
can only win in exporting its own state aid discipline to other
parts of the world.
The EU has successfully done so, through the agreement on
the European Economic Area ("EEA"), the so-called Europe
Agreements with Central and Eastern European Countries
("CEECs"), and the new Subsidy Code agreed during the Uru-
guay Round and the most recent Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") Shipbuilding Agree-
ment.
The most ambitious exercise has been the establishment of
the EEA through which all the EU's state aid rules and proce-
dures have been exported en bloc to those EFTA countries
which have joined the EEA. Identical EEA state aid control rules
are implemented by the EFTA Surveillance Authority ("ESA"),
the so-called Second Pillar. At the beginning of this year, ESA
had a stock of some 400 state aid cases, most of which were trans-
ferred to the Commission when Austria, Finland, and Sweden
joined the EU and when simultaneously the non-EU part of the
EEA and ESA's central shrunk to Norway, Iceland, and Liechten-
stein.
A hardly less ambitious operation has been adopted in the
Europe Agreements. The CEECs will respect substantive state
aid rules that correspond in principle to those applicable within
the EU in similar situations. They will not, however, set up
among themselves a plurinational control mechanism like ESA.
They will have to ensure the respect of their international obliga-
tions towards the EU through strictly national control mecha-
nisms. Whether such a mechanism can be implemented effec-
tively remains to be seen. In the light of the EU's own internal
experience, its seems almost impossible. The CEECs, however,
have one powerful incentive to succeed. In implementing cor-
rectly the state aid disciplines of the Europe Agreements, they
can avoid protective measures that the EU might otherwise apply
to their exports to the EU. The Europe Agreements place thus a
high premium on self-discipline.
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In the new multilateral agreement on subsidies and coun-
tervailing measures negotiated during the Uruguay Round and
to be monitored by the World Trade Organisation, the EU defi-
nition of subsidy was adopted. European Union state aid rules
and procedures have largely gained admittance with respect to
both actionable and non-actionable subsidies, in particular those
regarding regional aid.
The recent agreement negotiated in the framework of the
OECD on normal competitive conditions in the commercial
shipbuilding and repair industry is another example of the con-
vergence of internal state aid policy with external trade policy.
Lack of an effective commercial defense instrument against un-
fair competition on the world market in that sector has obliged
the EU for several decades to pursue a very costly sectoral state
aid policy, allowing production aid for shipbuilding. By sacrific-
ing this policy, which in any case ran contrary to its general aver-
sion to sectoral aid, the EU obtained, inter alia, the institution in
the same agreement of a code protecting it against injurious
pricing by shipbuilders in the signatory countries.
H. Strengthening DG I's Overall Responsibility for State Aid Control
While there is no realistic prospect of entrusting state aid
control in the EU to an independent European Competition Of-
fice, strong arguments plead in favor of a reorganization of re-
sponsibilities within the Commission. Contrary to antitrust mat-
ters, which are all attributed to the Directorate General for Com-
petition ("DG IV"), state aid control is traditionally divided
among of series of Commission departments. State aids fall
within the responsibility of DG IV, with the exception of agricul-
tural aids examined by the Directorate General for Agriculture
("DG VI"), transport aids by the Directorate General for Trans-
port ("DG VII"), fisheries aids by the Directorate General for
Fisheries ("DG XIV"), and coal aids by the Directorate General
for Energy ("DG XVII"). The explanation for this division of
tasks is probably more historical than logical.
An argument may be made for combining state aid monitor-
ing with the overall responsibilities for a given common policy,
like agriculture, fisheries, and transport. This argument, how-
ever, is only convincing with respect to state aid disciplines that
are sector-specific and therefore intimately linked to the particu-
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larities of a common policy. It does not carry weight if and in so
far as horizontal rules are to be applied, such as aid in favor of
disadvantaged regions, research and development, the environ-
ment, small and medium-sized enterprises and, most of all, res-
cue and restructuring aid. In particular, rescue and restructur-
ing operations should in the future be attributed exclusively to
DG IV, rather than divided among Commission departments.
Concentration in DG IV would guarantee coherence and
consistency. It would also diminish the influence of sectoral con-
siderations. It would strengthen DG IV's position among Com-
mission departments, a consideration that is worth bearing in
mind if one thinks of the medium-term perspective of its weak-
ening through the establishment of an independent European
Cartel Office for antitrust matters.
II. RESCUE AND RESTRUCTURING AIDS
The recent upsurge of critical comments are not directed
against the day-to-day monitoring of state aids by the Commis-
sion. The criticism focuses almost exclusively on a few spectacu-
lar decisions approving large sums of money injected into cer-
tain steel companies, airlines, and the French group Bull. While
attitudes of governments are relatively moderate, protests from
competitors, particularly from the private sectors, are aggressive.
Competitors criticize vociferously the levels of aid, the condi-
tions attached and the recidivist character of some of the restruc-
turing operations.
A. The Traditional Conditions for Restructuring Aids
The Commission's traditional practice with respect to res-
cue and restructuring aid is many years old, even if it has only
recently been clarified in guidelines. In July 1994, the .Commis-
sion adopted general guidelines for rescuing and restructuring
firms in difficulty.' 7 In November 1994, it supplemented these
guidelines with a communication that applies them specifically
to the aviation sector.' 8
Rescue aids are allowed as a short-term, transitional device
17. Commission Guidelines, OJ. C 368/12 (1994).
18. Application of Articles 92 and 98 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA
Agreement to State Aids in the Aviation Sector, No. 94/C 350/7, O.J. C 850/5 (1994).
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preceding a restructuring operation. They do not merit closer
examination in the context of this Article.
Restructuring aid is subject to a series of conditions which
have been expressly approved in principle in a recent decision of
the Court of Justice. 9 The most important of these conditions
are:
1) A restructuring plan which restores the long term viability
of the enterprise within a reasonable time scale and on the
basis of realistic assumptions as to its future operating condi-
tions.
2) Aid should not be higher than strictly necessary to enable
restructuring. Aid beneficiaries will be expected to make a
significant contribution to the restructuring plan. Aid should
not provide the enterprise with cash which can be used for
aggressive, marked distorting activities. Aid should not go to
finance new investment (like acquisitions) not required to
the restructuring. Aid for financial restructuring should not
unduly reduce the enterprise's financial charges.
3) In case of "a structural excess of production capacity in a
relevant market in the European Community served by the
recipient, the restructuring plan must make a contribution,
proportionate to the amount of aid received, to the restruc-
turing of the industry ... by irreversibly reducing or closing
capacity.20
A similar counterpart will normally not be required if there
is no structural excess capacity. The aid will be conditioned only
by the obligation not to expand capacity during the implementa-
tion of the restructuring plan, except where essential for restor-
ing viability. Capacity reductions in case of structural excess of
production capacity will be less important if the restructured en-
terprise is situated in assisted regions or is a SME.
While the first and second conditions are obvious, the third
is not. It has given rise to acrimonious debates among govern-
ments and industrialists in the different restructuring rounds,
for steel and shipbuilding. Though already accepted in princi-
ple by the Court ofJustice in earlier judgments and in particular
in a recent decision,2 ' the amount of capacity reduction will cer-
19. Spain v. Commission, Joined Cases C-278, 279 & 280/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4103,
4167, 1 65.
20. Commission Guidelines, O.J. C 368/12, at 16, 1 3.2.2.ii (1994).
21. Spain v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. 1-4103, 4167, 1 67. "The Commission is
1995] 1223
1224 FORDHAMINTERATATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1212
tainly be one of the most vigorously argued issues before the
Judges in Luxembourg. The reason is simple. The discussion
about the so-called counterpart goes to the very essence, the
raison dtre, of state aid control in the EU. Does state aid control
protect only or mainly the interests of Member States? Or does
it protect also and perhaps even primarily the interest of com-
petitors? Over the years, the emphasis has changed. Originally
concerned almost exclusively with Member States, today state aid
control is more and more understood as protecting competitors
against distortions of competition. It is obvious that the counter-
part of a restructuring aid grows in significance and in impor-
tance if it is seen as a contribution not only to the improvement
of the overall structure of the market, but also to the acceptabil-
ity of the grant to. the competitors. In this perspective, a coun-
terpart is not only required in case of a "structural excess of pro-
duction capacity in a relevant market in the European Commu-
nity,"2 2 but also in the absence of such a situation. There
remains of course the question what the counterpart should be
in such a case. The answer should be a reduction of market
share. A cut in production capacity might not necessarily be the
most appropriate means to achieve this end.
B. Privatization as a Condition?
It is remarkable that the Commission's July 1994 guidelines
do not mention one condition that has become very important
in the most recent restructuring operations, i.e., privatization.
Privatization as a condition for the approval of restructuring aid
is obviously a delicate issue. The Commission can take note of
the commitment of a Member State to privatize the enterprise to
be restructured. Through the viability condition, such a com-
mitment can even become a binding element of the Commis-
sion's decision.23
Can the Commission require privatization without a prior
undertaking by the Member State? At first sight, the principle of
right in considering that, in order to be declared compatible with Article 92(3) (c) of
the Treaty, aid to undertakings in difficulty must be bound to a restructuring pro-
gramme designed to reduce or redirect their activities." Id.
22. Commission Guidelines, O.J. C 368/12, at 16, 1 3.2.2.ii (1994).
23. Air France, Oj. L 254/73 (1994); Air France, O.J. L 258/26 (1994); Sabena,
OJ. L 300/48 (1991).
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neutrality2 4 seems to oppose this idea. The viability criterion,
however, may again justify it. Whatever one may think of the
reality of the neutrality principle, special circumstances will be
necessary to insist on such a condition. The most obvious candi-
dates for privatization requests are recidivists, i.e. public enter-
prises that have already benefitted from restructuring aid, but
that have to be supported again by further grants of state aid. In
such a case, the Member State concerned has demonstrated that
it is not able to assure viability without the strong presence of a
private partner.
It is obvious that privatization can diminish the amount of
aid necessary for restructuring. A lower level of aid leads logi-
cally to a smaller counterpart, like a smaller reduction of capac-
ity. Such a smaller reduction of capacity can be vital for the sur-
vival of the enterprise to be restructured, if bigger cuts would
jeopardize its future viability. This is another possible contribu-
tion of privatization to the success of rescue and restructuring
operations.
C. The "One Time, Last Time" Principle
Another condition which as attracted considerable atten-
tion during the last months is only mentioned en passant in the
July 1994 general guidelines: "Like rescue aid, aid for restructur-
ing should normally only need to be granted once."25 It is, how-
ever, discussed in detail in the November 1994 communication
on state aids in the aviation sector. After referring to the Wise
Men's (Comiti des Sages) Report of February 1994 which had rec-
ommended a clear and genuine "one time, last time" condition,
the Commission declared:
Some ideas of the Comit6, however, cannot be accepted by
the Commission. It is not possible for the Commission to
change or disregard the EC Treaty. This means, in particular,
that the condition that the aid is the last one has, of course, to
be interpreted in conformity with Community law. This im-
plies that such a condition does not prevent a Member State
from notifying a further aid to a company which has already
been granted aid. According to the Court of Justice case law,
in such a case the Commission will take all the relevant ele-
24. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 222.
25. Commission Guidelines, OJ. C 368/12 at 16, 13.2.2 (1994).
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ments into account. An important element in the Commis-
sion's assessment will be the fact that the company has al-
ready been granted State aid. Therefore, the Commission
will not allow further aid unless under exceptional circum-
stances unforeseeable and external to the company. 26
The practical importance of this statement is obvious. It has
been demonstrated by the prospect of a new rescue and restruc-
turing operation for the Spanish airline Iberia2 7 and by the pub-
lic controversies between the Commissioner for Transport in
1993-94, Marcelino Oreja, and the Commissioner for Competi-
tion, Karel Van Miert.
It is not our intention to analyze the precise meaning and
the legal merit of the different elements of the Commission's
statement. Only one aspect should be highlighted in the con-
text of this Article. The "one time, last time" principle is rela-
tively new. It has found its most solid expression in the Decem-
ber 1993 conclusions of the Council2 8 giving its assent to the re-
cent restructuring aids in the steel industry. At the request of
the Council, all Commission decisions authorizing restructuring
aid to certain steel companies are subject to the condition that
the Member State concerned "shall not request any further dero-
gation under Article 95 ... should a return to viability not be
achieved by [the end of the restructuring period]." The princi-
ple is also to be found by the new multilateral agreement on
subsidies and countervailing measures negotiated during the
Uruguay Round. Article 5 of the agreement enjoins members
not to cause "serious prejudice to the interests of another mem-
ber." Article 6 specifies that serious prejudice shall be deemed
to exist in the case of subsidies to cover operating losses sus-
tained by an enterprise "other than one-time measures which are
non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise."29
Compared with these texts, the Commission's statement in
the November Communication on state aids in the aviation sec-
tor seems weaker, as it opens the door for second-time aid in
26. Commission guidelines on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC
Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to state aid in the aviation sector, 0J. C
350/5 at 7, 1 5 (1994).
27. The Commission decided on March 1, 1995 to open an investigation into a
new aid package for Iberia (decision not yet published).
28. 26 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 50.
29. Council Decision No. 94/800/EC, O.J. L 336/1, 158 (1994).
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case of exceptional circumstances unforeseeable and external to
the company. Much depends, however, on the interpretation
and practical implementation of this proviso. It would express a
common sense principle if it were applied only to real cas deforce
majeure situations, like the Gulf War. It would, however, go
much further if the deterioration of the value of a currency were
qualified as unforeseeable. Currency fluctuations are normal
and have to be taken into account by economic operators. The
Commission should allow only real cas de force majeure excep-
tions. If it acted otherwise, it would de facto destroy the "one
time, last time" principle in the aviation sector.
Whatever happens with respect to aviation, the overall trend
of state aid monitoring has become tighter. This is largely attrib-
utable to Karel van Miert, the Commissioner responsible for
transport when Sabena, the leading case, was decided"° and who
defended the Commission's position on steel aids in the Council
during the last steel crisis.
D. Must There Always Be a "One Time"?
The "one time, last time" principle leads to a more funda-
mental consideration. Why should there be a "one time?"
Could the Commission simply refuse the authorization of re-
structuring aid, even if all normal conditions for such an author-
ization, namely restructuring plan leading to viability, counter-
part, aid limited to the strict minimum needed for restructuring,
etc., are met?
In order to be perfectly clear, it must be emphasized that
the question does not address the situation in which an enter-
prise cannot be made viable (taking into account the counter-
part that is required to compensate the amount of aid necessary
for restructuring). In such a situation, the Commission will not
authorize the aid.
Our question is based on another hypothesis. The ailing
enterprise can be made viable; the necessary counterpart can be
provided. Might the Commission nevertheless say no?
From a strictly legal point of view, the answer is affirmative.
The Commission is entitled to refuse the authorization. Article
92 does not declare that restructuring aids "shall be compatible
30. Sabena, O.J. L 300/48 (1991).
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with the common market.""1 Restructuring aids have to bejusti-
fied under Article 92(3) according to which certain aids "may be
considered to be compatible with the common market." The
vast majority of these aids can only be approved under Article
92(3) (c), which provides for authorization of "aid to facilitate
the development of certain economic activities... where such
aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent con-
trary to the common interest."3 2 The Commission could declare
that restructuring aid in a certain sector does affect trading con-
ditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, in view of
the particular economic situation in the sector.
It is remarkable that the Commission has never done so.
The explanation is clearly political. The declaration that restruc-
turing aids in a certain sector are per se against the common
interest would clearly mean an industrial policy for that sector.
The Commission is, however, opposed to sectoral industrial pol-
icy. It is committed to establishing horizontal rules in order to
promote the competitiveness of European industry. The ex-
isting practice with respect to restructuring aids is part of that
horizontal framework. It is therefore useful to maintain it.
But does this reasoning also apply to those sectors in which
the EU has adopted sectoral policies and in which even the
Council has been active as a legislator? If the existing state aid
discipline for Steel (the so-called Steel Aid Code 3 ) does not al-
low a certain type of restructuring operation, why has the Com-
mission asked the Council for its assent, under Article 95 of the
ECSC Treaty, to derogate from the Code and to authorize these
operations nevertheless? Again, the explanation is not legal, but
political. Every Member State has the right to notify aid, even
incompatible with the Code, and ask for a derogation. The
Commission, however, has no legal obligation to follow this re-
quest. It has done so in part because of its general attitude to
restructuring aid under the EC Treaty. It could, however, per-
fectly well change its mind in view of the particularities of the
steel sector and the ECSC Treaty, in particular its fundamental
prohibition of state aids in Article 4c. To do so, the Commission
would need to avoid the argument that, having asked for deroga-
31. EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 92(2).
32. Id. art. 92(3)(c).
33. Commission Decision No. 3855/91/ECSC, O.J. L 362/57 (1991).
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tions for a certain number of enterprises, it would discriminate
against the remaining companies which are in difficulties but
have not yet had a chance to benefit from a restructuring opera-
tion. The new policy would therefore have to be announced suf-
ficiently in advance, allowing for a transitional period during
which restructuring operations eligible for a derogation under
the existing practice would still be entitled to a derogation from
the steel aid code.
CONCLUSION
In view of the experience of recent years, the Commission
would be well advised to take that courageous step. Otherwise, it
is almost certain to be confronted with a new wave of restructur-
ing operations in a few years time, as Martin Bangemann and
Karel Van Miert have recently warned on several occasions.
Whether this wave could be resisted in applying the "one time,
last time" principle is doubtful, as it depends on the enterprises
to be restructured and on the interpretation of the principle
with respect to the period covered. Why is it likely that the steel
sector will see a new wave of restructuring operations in case of a
serious economic downturn? One of the most important rea-
sons is the existence of large publicly controlled steel companies.
It is our firm conviction that publicly controlled enterprises face
particular difficulties in highly competitive markets and that they
are therefore likely candidates for repetitive restructuring opera-
tions. It remains for another article, however, to discuss the
competitive advantages and disadvantages of public enterprises
or the reality of the neutrality principle of the EC Treaty.
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